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I. INTRODUCTION 
The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created rule that determines 
whether contract or tort law applies when a defective product causes damage.  
The doctrine‘s starting premise is that contract law governs if the defective 
product causes economic loss and that tort law governs when the defective 
product causes property damage.  A common refrain is that the doctrine was 
created to prevent contract law from drowning in a sea of tort.  However, as 
the rule has developed, courts have continued to expand contract coverage at 
the expense of tort coverage.  First, when the defective product damages only 
itself, the courts conclude that such property damage should be resolved under 
contract law, not tort law.  Next, when the defective product damages the 
system of which it was a component part, the courts conclude that such 
property damage should also be resolved under contract law, not tort law.  
The rule that evolved from this judicial process is the ―other property‖ rule, 
which is also known as the ―other property‖ exception to the economic loss 
doctrine.  Stated more simply, the ―other property‖ rule provides that when a 
defective product causes property damage, tort law will only be available 
when the property damage is ―other than‖ damage to the product or its 
integrated system. 
Recently, another rule has begun to receive judicial acceptance that further 
expands the coverage of contract law at the expense of tort law.  The rule is 
called the ―disappointed expectations‖ test or the ―reasonably foreseeable‖ 
rule.  It provides that property damage that was reasonably foreseeable at the 
time of contracting is recoverable only under contract law, not tort law.  The 
purpose of this Article is to examine the disappointed expectations rule and 
determine whether it is a positive addition to the legal landscape of the 
economic loss doctrine. 
 
 Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.  I would like to thank Luke Schneider, 
J.D. 2009, Marquette University, for his excellent research on this Article. 
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II. THE ―OTHER PROPERTY‖ EXCEPTION TO THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
The economic loss doctrine provides that when a defective product causes 
solely economic loss,
1
 the buyer may pursue damages only through contract 
law.
2
  On the other hand, if the defective product causes personal injury or 
property damage, the buyer may pursue damages through tort law.
3
  The rules 
are simple to state but difficult to apply.  As developed by the courts, the 
determination has become even more difficult.  Contract law now covers 
some types of property damage and tort law covers other types of property 
damage.  For example, a product that fails and damages only itself has caused 
property damage, but not the type of property damage that permits the use of 
tort theories.
4
  Damage to the product itself is tantamount to loss of product 
value and is not considered property damage.
5
  In other words, does it really 
matter whether the product fails to function properly or simply explodes?  In 
either case, if there is no other damage, the loss is of product value and is 
considered solely an economic loss.
6
 
But what if the defective product causes damages beyond itself and 
damages the system of which it is a part?  Here again, the general rule is that 
when a defective product causes damage to the system of which it is a part, 
such property damage is not sufficient to permit the injured party to pursue 
tort theories.
7
  This is known as the integrated system rule.
8
  The integrated 
system rule stems from the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in East 
River Steamship Corp. v. Trans America Delaval Inc.
9
  In East River, turbines 
were installed as part of a propulsion system for supertankers.
10
  Upon use, the 
turbines proved defective and damaged the supertanker‘s propulsion system.11  
After incurring $8 million in damages,
12
 the ship owners sued the shipbuilder 
on tort theories, arguing that the defective turbines caused ―other property‖ 
 
1. For a discussion of the distinction between economic loss and noneconomic loss, see 
generally Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss from 
Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081 (2008). 
2. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213, 217–18 
(Wis. 1989). 
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998). 
4. Id. § 21 cmt. d; see E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 
(1986). 
5. See Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45, 52 (Ill. 1997). 
6. See id. 
7. E. River, 476 U.S. at 875–76; Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445, 
452 (Wis. 1999). 
8. Wausau Tile, 593 N.W.2d at 452. 
9. 476 U.S. 858. 
10. Id. at 859. 
11. Id. at 860–61. 
12. Id. at 861. 
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damage by injuring the propulsion system.
13
  The Court noted that ―[i]n the 
traditional [other] ‗property damage‘ cases, the defective product damages 
other property.‖14  But, in this case, the Court held there was no ―other 
property‖ damage.15  Rather, the Court reasoned that the turbines were part of 
an integrated product and, as such, when the defective turbines damaged the 
product of which it was a part, there was no ―other property‖ damage.16  The 
Court reasoned that ―all but the very simplest of machines have component 
parts,‖ and, as such, ―‗[a contrary] holding would require a finding of [other] 
‗property damage‘ in virtually every case where a product damages itself.  
Such a holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict 
products liability.‘‖17 
The impact of the integrated system rule is to expand the domain of 
contract law by shrinking those cases that qualify as ―other property‖ damage 
under tort law.  Thus, a defective product that causes damage to itself or its 
integrated system has not caused sufficient property damage to engender tort 
remedies.  Rather, the defective product must cause property damage other 
than to itself or its integrated system to trigger tort theories.
18
  This is the 
―other property‖ rule of the economic loss doctrine.  In this Article the use of 
the term ―other property‖ is intended to mean property damage that is other 
than damage to the product or its integrated system. 
III. THE DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATIONS RULE AND ―OTHER PROPERTY‖ 
DAMAGE 
It is well established that when a defective product causes solely economic 
loss, the aggrieved buyer‘s claim will be resolved under contract law.19  On 
the other hand, it is equally clear that if the defective product causes personal 
injury or property damage, the injured party has a tort claim.
20
  The property 
damage claim, however, has been narrowed by the integrated system rule so 
that the property damage must be to property ―other than‖ the product or the 
system of which it is an integral part.
21
  In other words, a tort claim only exists 
 
13. See id. at 867. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. (second alteration added) (quoting N. Power & Eng‘g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
623 P.2d 324, 330 (Alaska 1981)). 
18. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997). 
19. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Wis. 
1989). 
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998). 
21. See supra Part II. 
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if the defective product damages ―other property.‖  Contract law and tort law 
agree on this formulation of the meaning of ―other property.‖ 
The disappointed expectations rule is a further erosion of the general 
principle that permits tort claims for damage to ―other property.‖22  The rule 
provides that ―other property‖ is not damaged when a defective product 
causes property damage, ―but the damage was within the scope of bargaining, 
or . . . ‗the occurrence of such damage could have been the subject of 
negotiations.‘‖23  A number of states have adopted the ―disappointed 
expectations‖ test or ―reasonably foreseeable‖ test.24  Also, some academic 
literature strongly supports the test.
25
 
 
22. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 175 (Wis. 2005). 
23. Id. (quoting Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Mich. 1992)). 
24. IOWA: Conveyor Co. v. SunSource Tech. Servs., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1012–13 (N.D. 
Iowa 2005) (concluding that claims fell within unfulfilled expectations regarding quality of the 
hydraulic lift); Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Iowa 1995) (Growth 
hormone did not grow cattle as expected, and only contract damages were available because product 
did not perform as expected.); Nelson v. Todd‘s Ltd., 426 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Iowa 1988) (Harm to 
Nelson‘s meat because of defective curing agent led to only contract damages because harm was a 
foreseeable result from a ―failure of the product to work properly.‖).  But see Ballard v. Amana 
Soc‘y, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Iowa 1995) (―Unlike the damages suffered by the plaintiffs in 
Nelson, we believe the injuries to the Ballards‘ swine herd support damages in tort.  We believe the 
existence of toxins in the feed corn was a genuine hazard peripheral to the sale and a serious product 
defect, causing the death of swine and a significant business interruption.‖) (Note this is the same 
court in the same year as Tomka.).  KANSAS: AgriStor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208, 1217–
18 (D. Kan. 1986) (―This is clearly different than the case at hand where the damage resulted simply 
from the product‘s failure to live up to expectations.‖).  KENTUCKY: Gooch v. E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 40 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876 (W.D. Ky. 1999) (predicting Kentucky would apply a 
disappointed performance expectations test to the economic loss doctrine when damages were from 
chemical applied to corn crop).  MICHIGAN: Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 241 
(6th Cir. 1994) (―[T]ort claims for damage to other property are barred by the economic loss doctrine 
if those losses are direct and consequential losses that were within the contemplation of the 
parties . . . .‖  This case involved a faulty pipe exploding at and damaging a power plant.); 
Theuerkauf v. United Vaccines Div. of Harlan Sprague Dawley, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1238, 1241–42 
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that damages to mink from vaccine were economic losses and 
paralleling the case with Neibarger); Neibarger, 486 N.W.2d at 621 (Damage to cattle herd due to 
faulty milking system were economic losses because economic expectations were not met.).  
MINNESOTA: Veldhuizen v. A.O. Smith Corp., 839 F. Supp. 669, 677 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding 
that damages to silage and cattle due to faulty silo that failed to work as expected were economic 
damages not exempted as ―other property‖); AgriStor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 908 
(D. Minn. 1985) (holding that damages to alfalfa feed and cattle due to faulty silo that failed to work 
as expected were economic damages not exempted as ―other property‖); Thofson v. Redex Indus., 
Inc., 433 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that damage to grain due to a faulty grain 
dryer was economic damage that could be contemplated by the parties and did not fall within ―other 
property‖ exception).  NEW JERSEY: In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 362 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(applying a foreseeability approach and holding that damages to food stocks due to a faulty 
refrigerator were economic losses); Int‘l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. v. McCormick & Co., 575 F. 
Supp. 2d 654, 661, 663 (D.N.J. 2008) (applying a foreseeability analysis and holding, where 
barbecue seasoning was damaged by faulty paprika, this was not ―other property‖ damage).  NORTH 
DAKOTA: Dakota Gasification Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., 91 F.3d 1094, 1101 (8th Cir. 1996) 
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It has also been predicted that a number of states will reject the 
disappointed expectations test or reasonably foreseeable test.
26
  The leading 
case on the disappointed expectations rule is the Wisconsin Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Grams v. Milk Products, Inc.
27
  In Grams, dairy farmers purchased 
a milk substitute to feed their newborn calves during the first few weeks of 
their lives when the calves‘ immune systems were developing.28  After using 
the product for a short period, the calves did not gain weight and appeared 
gaunt and hungry.
29
  In addition, the mortality rates for the calves tripled 
during the use of the milk substitute.
30
  The Gramses believed that the milk 
substitute actually damaged the calves‘ immune systems.31  The Gramses filed 
suit against the manufacturer and others on contract and tort theories for the 
death and damage caused by the defective product to their calves.
32
  The court 
acknowledged that the integrated system rule would not preclude the 
 
(holding that the collapse of a plant that damaged materials within were economic damages of a 
foreseeable risk; also predicting that North Dakota state courts will follow the disappointed 
performance expectations test); Albers v. Deere & Co., No. 1:08-cv-040, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
73189, at *27–28 (D.N.D. Sept. 24, 2008) (holding that damage to combine header due to combine 
fire was economic damages and following Dakota Gasification‘s prediction).  OKLAHOMA: United 
Golf, LLC v. Westlake Chem. Corp., No. 05-CV-0495-CVE-PJC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57531, at 
*14–15 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 15, 2006) (citing Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 834 P.2d 
980, 982 (Okla. 1992)) (applying a foreseeability approach and predicting that under Oklahoma law, 
damages to the course and sod would be economic damages).  SOUTH CAROLINA: Palmetto Linen 
Serv., Inc. v. U.N.X., Inc., 205 F.3d 126, 130 (4th Cir. 2000) (predicting that South Carolina would 
apply a disappointed performance expectations test and holding that damages to linens due to faulty 
chemical dispensers in washers were foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties); Myrtle 
Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027, 1061 (D.S.C. 1993) (holding that 
cleanup costs and damages from pipeline component that caused a spill were economic because they 
were foreseeable and within contemplation of the parties).  VIRGINIA: Sensenbrenner v. Rust, 
Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Va. 1988) (holding that, where architect drew 
faulty design for new home and pool, damages were economic due to disappointed economic 
expectations); Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 111 F.3d 1174, 1182–83 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying 
Sensenbrenner in a similar manner).  WISCONSIN: Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 179–80 (applying the 
disappointed performance expectations test to conclude that damages were economic where calves 
were damaged due to defective milk replacer). 
25. See, e.g., MacKenzie Mayes Walter, Note, The Solution to the Economic Loss Doctrine 
Confusion: The Disappointed Expectations Test, 95 KY. L.J. 943 (2006). 
26. MARYLAND: Pac. Indem. Co. v. Whaley, 572 F. Supp. 2d 626, 631 (D. Md. 2008) 
(predicting Maryland as not supportive of a foreseeability test while also distinguishing the property 
damaged in the house because of the defective roof as ―other property‖).  PENNSYLVANIA: 2-J 
Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 539, 542–44 (3d Cir. 1997) (predicting Pennsylvania as not supportive of a 
foreseeability test while also distinguishing the property damaged in the warehouse because of its 
collapse as ―other property‖). 
27. 699 N.W.2d 167. 
28. Id. at 170. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
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Gramses‘ tort claims.33  The milk substitute was obviously not a component 
part of a larger system that would preclude a finding of ―other property‖ 
damage.  Rather, the Wisconsin Supreme Court sought to adopt another 
exception to the ―other property‖ rule because, in the court‘s opinion, ―[t]he 
‗integrated system‘ concept does not translate well to all situations involving 
property damage to which the economic loss doctrine logically applies.‖34  
The court held that ―if [the] claimed damages are the result of disappointed 
expectations of a bargained-for product‘s performance, the economic loss 
doctrine applies to bar the plaintiff‘s tort claims.‖35  The Grams result meant 
that there was no tort claim for the Gramses‘ ―other property‖ damage. 
There are two rationales offered to support adoption of the reasonably 
foreseeable test.  First, the reasonably foreseeable test is a logical extension of 
the integrated system rule.
36
  The United States Supreme Court in East River 
created the integrated system rule.
37
  In East River, defective turbines were 
installed in a ship, and they subsequently damaged the ship‘s propulsion 
system.
38
  The Supreme Court held that since the turbines were part of an 
integrated system, damage to the system should be treated as damage to the 
product.
39
  The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would completely 
engulf all contract law within tort law.
40
  The reasoning of the integrated 
system rule has been accepted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
41
  The 
premise of the rule is simple.  It is reasonably foreseeable that a defective 
component part will likely damage the system of which it is a part, and, as 
such, such damage should not be considered ―other property‖ damage, but 
damage within the contemplation of the sales contract.
42
  When a product is 
purchased, both parties should be considering the possibility that the product 
may prove defective and protect themselves accordingly.
43
  Obviously, when 
the product is a component part of a system, damage to the system is an 
eminently foreseeable event, and, as such, the contract between the parties 
should address that possibility.
44
  Thus, the integrated system rule is based 
 
33. Id. at 175. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 169. 
36. Id. at 179. 
37. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); supra Part II. 
38. E. River, 476 U.S. at 860. 
39. Id. at 867. 
40. Id. 
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998). 
42. See E. River, 476 U.S. at 867–68. 
43. See id. 
44. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 179 (Wis. 2005). 
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squarely on the foreseeability that a defective component will damage its 
system.
45
 
The disappointed expectations rule is a logical extension of the integrated 
system rule.  It simply extends the damages that are foreseeable beyond the 
product‘s integrated system to all those damages that were foreseeable at the 
time of contracting.  It should be noted, however, that the integrated system 
rule is manageable because the court or parties need to determine only the 
system and its component parts.  Whereas under the disappointed expectations 
test, all reasonably foreseeable damages within the scope of the bargain are 
covered, which is an extremely vague rule.
46
 
There is a second and perhaps more compelling reason for the rule.  
Contract law and product liability law serve different purposes.  Product 
liability law governs the relationship between a consumer and a manufacturer 
where it is generally not possible for the parties to negotiate all the terms of 
sale.  Product liability law, therefore, places a burden on the manufacturer to 
produce safe products.  On the other hand, contract law applies to commercial 
transactions where the terms and conditions of the sale can be negotiated to 
each party‘s satisfaction.  Contract law operates on the assumption that 
commercial parties through the bargaining process can allocate the costs and 
risks of the product‘s nonperformance.  When a defective product is 
purchased in a commercial setting and it causes property damage, both tort 
and contract law are implicated.  When the Grams court adopted the 
disappointed expectations rule, the court clearly indicated that the bargaining 
rationale should control.
47
  The court reasoned that ―[t]he ‗disappointed 
expectations‘ concept is grounded in contract principles of bargaining and risk 
sharing, not on a redefinition of ‗other property.‘‖48  A fair question, however, 
is whether the focus should be on the potential bargain or the actual bargain 
struck between the parties.
49
 
The disappointed expectations rule as enunciated by the Grams court is 
essentially a reasonably foreseeable test.
50
  In other words, if the damages 
suffered by the buyer of the defective product were reasonably foreseeable at 
the time of contracting, the buyer should have negotiated for such protection 
in the contract.
51
  The consequence of the buyer having failed to negotiate for 
 
45. See id. 
46. See infra Part IV. 
47. Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 176. 
48. Id. 
49. The author believes the bargaining rationale is a valid one, but only when focused on the 
actual bargain struck between the parties, and not on a hypothetical bargain, as is the focus of the 
reasonably foreseeable test.  The author‘s next Article will develop this proposal.  
50. Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 182 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).  
51. Id. at 178 (majority opinion). 
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protection from foreseeable ―other property‖ damage is the preclusion of any 
tort claim.
52
  In applying the reasonably foreseeable test, the court stated that 
the first inquiry is to determine the buyer‘s expectations for the product.53  
That determination requires ―an inquiry into the substance and the purpose of 
the transaction.‖54  In Grams, the court concluded that the purchase of the 
milk substitute was intended to foster the growth and healthy development of 
the newborn calves.
55
  The next determination is whether the claim is about 
the buyer‘s disappointment with the product‘s performance.56  The court 
found that it would be difficult to find ―a better example of disappointed 
expectations than a product . . . expected to nourish animals but leaves them 
malnourished‖ and dead.57  In the court‘s opinion, the malnourishment and 
high mortality of the calves were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the 
product‘s failed performance.58  Therefore, the Gramses‘ failure to anticipate 
and contract for protection against such ―other property‖ damage prevented 
them from being able to pursue tort remedies.
59
 
Finally, the disappointed expectations rule converts ―other property‖ 
damage, which is usually compensable through tort law, into consequential 
damages governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).  
Consequential damages are defined by the U.C.C. as ―any loss resulting from 
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of 
contracting had reason to know,‖60 and ―injury to person or property 
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.‖61  The test for recovering 
consequential damages is whether they were reasonably foreseeable by the 
seller.
62
  It is not necessary that they were actually foreseen.
63
  The U.C.C. 
imposes an objective rather than a subjective standard in determining whether 
the seller should have foreseen the consequential damage caused by the 
seller‘s breach.64 
The leading case that illustrates the conversion of ―other property‖ 
damages into consequential damages is Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, 
 
52. Id. at 180. 
53. Id. at 179. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. See id. at 179–80. 
59. Id. 
60. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2003); WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(a) (2007–2008). 
61. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b); WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b). 
62. 4A RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, at 
128 (3d ed. 2009). 
63. See id. 
64. Id. 
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Inc.
65
  In Neibarger, dairy farmers purchased a milking machine to assist in 
their milking process.
66
  Several years after the milking machine had been in 
operation, the farmers‘ cattle became ill and died or had to be sold for 
slaughter.
67
  The court found that damage caused by the failure of the product 
to perform as expected caused damage to ―other property.‖68  The court 
further reasoned that where such ―other property‖ damage was foreseeable at 
the time of contracting, the U.C.C. provides remedies sufficient to compensate 
the buyer of a defective product for direct, incidental, and consequential 
damages, including property damages.
69
 
In sum, the disappointed expectations test is a reasonably foreseeable test.  
One of the rationales for its adoption is that the test is a logical extension of 
the integrated system rule, which is also a foreseeability rule.  However, the 
integrated system rule is a much more manageable rule than the disappointed 
expectations rule.  Also, the bargaining rationale falls short as a sufficient 
justification to increase contract coverage at the expense of tort coverage 
because it focuses on a bargain that could have been struck between the 
parties rather than on an actual bargain struck between them.  Finally, the 
effect of the disappointed expectations rule is to convert ―other property‖ 
damage, normally compensable through tort law, into consequential damages 
under the U.C.C., which thereby subjects the damages to exclusion under the 
Code. 
IV. THE CASE AGAINST THE DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATIONS TEST 
A. The Disappointed Expectations Rule Grants to Seller/Manufacturer an 
Un-bargained for and Unspecified Tort Immunity for Its Defective Products 
One of the primary reasons for the creation of the economic loss doctrine 
was to prevent an aggrieved party, who had suffered solely economic loss 
from a defective product, from circumventing the contractual disclaimer, 
limitation of remedies, and consequential damage exclusions by suing in tort, 
rather than on the contract.
70
  The theory is that the disclaimers, remedy 
limitations, and damage limitations were part of the bargain struck and likely 
resulted in a lower price for the buyer.
71
  In those circumstances, where the 
 
65. 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992). 
66. Id. at 613. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 620. 
69. Id. 
70. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213, 215 (Wis. 
1989). 
71. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 175 n.8 (Wis. 2005). 
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parties‘ contract anticipated the possibility of certain losses and provided for 
them, the parties‘ contract should control.  The ―end run‖ around the parties‘ 
contract to tort should not be permitted.
72
  There is no controversy when the 
defective product causes solely economic loss.
73
  The defective product causes 
no property damage, so no public safety issues are involved.  The parties‘ 
contract and contract principles are considered appropriate to address the 
dispute between the parties. 
―Other property‖ damage caused by a defective product, however, is 
normally remedied through tort, not contract law.
74
  The only recognized 
exception to that rule is when the defective product damages itself or the 
system of which it is an integral part.
75
  The disappointed expectations rule is 
a significant incursion into the definition of ―other property.‖  The 
disappointed expectations rule ―governs situations in which a commercial 
product causes property damage but the damage . . . ‗could have been the 
subject of negotiations between the parties‘‖ at the time of contracting.76  If 
the property damage was within the contemplation of the parties or otherwise 
foreseeable at the time of contracting, such property damage is not considered 
―other property‖ damage.  In other words, even though the defective product 
has damaged ―other property‖ that would be actionable through tort law,77 the 
disappointed expectations rule has created an immunity from such tort 
liability.  The tort immunity is provided simply because the damages were 
foreseeable by the buyer and, thus, could have been the subject of contract 
negotiations. 
Immunity from tort liability normally occurs through the use of an 
exculpatory clause in a contract.
78
  An exculpatory clause is a provision that 
relieves ―a party from liability resulting from a negligent or wrongful act.‖79  
Clauses ―intended to exculpate a party from the consequences of its own 
negligence are frowned upon by the law and strictly construed against the 
party seeking‖ immunity from liability.80  An exculpatory clause is obviously 
a significant clause in a contract,
81
 and, as such, one would expect to bargain 
 
72. Bay Breeze Condo. Ass‘n v. Norco Windows, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2002). 
73. See Anzivino, supra note 1, at 1082. 
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998). 
75. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 N.W.2d 445, 453 (Wis. 1999); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e. 
76. Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 175 (quoting Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 
620 (Mich. 1992)). 
77. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997). 
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981). 
79. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (8th ed. 2004). 
80. Fendley v. Power Battery Co., 561 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (App. Div. 1990). 
81. Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 691 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Wis. 2005). 
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for such protection.
82
  In fact, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,
83
 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court specified stringent requirements that must be 
met to include an exculpatory clause in a contract.  In Bucyrus, the buyer 
purchased cranes for use on offshore drilling platforms in the North Sea.
84
  
The cranes proved defective, and the buyer sued to recover its damages.
85
  
The seller sought to exculpate itself from all tort liability through the 
contractually agreed remedy of replacing any defective parts.
86
  The court, 
however, rejected the exculpatory clause as unreasonable.
87
  In addition to not 
providing a fair remedy for the buyer‘s losses, the court identified two other 
requirements that must be satisfied in order to include an exculpatory clause 
in a contract.  First, it must be ―apparent that an express bargain was struck to 
forego the possibility of tort recovery in exchange for negotiated alternate 
economic advantages, e.g., lower contract cost or express concessions on 
other terms.‖88  Second, ―as a matter of public policy, [the court will] not 
countenance such disclaimers in the absence of such specificity in respect to 
the tort disclaimed.‖89  In other words, an exculpatory clause in a contract will 
be upheld where it was expressly bargained for and the clause clearly 
specifies the tort disclaimed. 
The disappointed expectations rule clearly violates both tenets required by 
Bucyrus.  First, the tort immunity provided by application of the rule is not 
bargained for by the seller/manufacturer.  In application, the 
seller/manufacturer is granted tort immunity automatically if the buyer does 
not anticipate his potential damages and provide for some protection from 
them.  Second, as a matter of public policy, a valid exculpatory clause must 
clearly specify the tortious conduct that is being exculpated.  The disappointed 
expectations rule provides tort immunity for the seller/manufacturer from all 
damages that were foreseeable or within the contemplation of the parties at 
the time of contract formation.  There is no specificity requirement.  Thus, the 
disappointed expectations rule also fails the specificity requirement.  In sum, 
the disappointed expectations rule severely distorts the free bargaining 
between a buyer and a seller in favor of the seller/manufacturer by providing 
un-bargained for and nonspecific tort immunity. 
 
82. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872–73 (1986). 
83. 388 N.W.2d 584 (Wis. 1986). 
84. Id. at 586. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 588. 
87. Id. at 591. 
88. Id. at 589 (citing Arnold v. Shawano County Agric. Soc‘y, 330 N.W.2d 773, 779 (Wis. 
1983)). 
89. Id. 
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B. The Disappointed Expectations Rule Essentially Destroys the “Other 
Property” Exception to the Economic Loss Doctrine 
The impact of adopting the disappointed expectations rule is to destroy the 
general tort rule that damage to ―other property‖ is recoverable through tort 
law.  The disappointed expectations rule provides that when a defective 
product causes property damage and that damage was foreseeable at the time 
of contracting, the buyer can pursue only contract remedies, not tort.
90
  The 
test is uniformly understood to be a reasonably foreseeable test.
91
  In other 
words, ―when a defective product causes damage to [‗]other property[‘] in a 
manner that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting, the damage 
is considered economic loss.‖92  On the other hand, ―when [the defective 
product] causes damage in a manner that was not reasonably foreseeable,‖ the 
damage is considered ―other property‖ damage and is actionable under tort 
law.
93
  In essence, the critical distinction between whether contract law or tort 
law is available under the disappointed expectations test is the foreseeability 
of the property damage at the time of contracting. 
Foreseeability is a well-recognized requirement for the recovery of 
damages.  Damages must be foreseeable under both contract law
94
 and the 
U.C.C.
95
  In addition, damages must also be foreseeable under both 
negligence
96
 and strict liability.
97
  The damages must be a foreseeable 
consequence of the breach for contracts, U.C.C., and negligence.  For strict 
liability, the manufacturer is responsible for the damages caused by a 
defective product‘s foreseeable use.98  In any event, foreseeability is a 
requirement to be satisfied before recovery is permitted under either contract 
law or tort law. 
It is axiomatic that tort law permits recovery from a manufacturer and 
others in the distributive chain for foreseeable physical harm to property 
caused by product defects.
99
  The problem with the disappointed expectations 
rule is that it destroys the foregoing axiom.  If a defective product causes 
 
90. Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 973 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Grams v. 
Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 175 (Wis. 2005). 
91. Rich, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 972–73; Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 182 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); 
see also supra Part III. 
92. Rich, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (internal quotation added). 
93. Id. 
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981). 
95. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2003); WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b) (2007–2008). 
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965). 
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, § 16 cmt. a, § 10 cmt. b, illust. 1 
(1998). 
98. Id. § 1 cmt. a. 
99. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 879 (1997). 
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―other property‖ damage and the court finds such damage was foreseeable at 
the time of contracting, all tort theories are precluded.  In other words, the 
only circumstance where one could pursue tort theories for ―other property‖ 
damages would be when those damages were not foreseeable at the time of 
contracting.  However, if the damages are not foreseeable for contract 
purposes, they are likely not foreseeable for tort purposes either. 
The courts have recognized this consequence.  In Messer Griesheim 
Industries, Inc. v. Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc.,
100
 a distributor of liquid carbon 
dioxide sued its producer for damages that arose from the retail sale of 
contaminated carbon dioxide.
101
  Liquid carbon dioxide is used at the retail 
level for various food and medical purposes.
102
  The distributor sued under 
negligence and strict liability and claimed that the contaminated carbon 
dioxide caused ―other property‖ damage.103  In particular, the damage claimed 
to be ―other property‖ damage was (1) damage to the distributor‘s storage 
tanks; (2) contamination of the distributor‘s other liquid carbon dioxide by 
mixing in the contaminated carbon dioxide; (3) its customers‘ soft drinks were 
rendered unsalable; and (4) its customers‘ soft drink cans were ruined.104  The 
producer argued that ―other property‖ does not include the type of property 
that one would reasonably expect to be injured as a direct consequence of the 
failure of a defective product.
105
  The producer argued that the distributor‘s 
losses were essentially damages for failed commercial expectations and not 
recoverable in tort.
106
  The court acknowledged the logic of the producer‘s 
argument by noting that ―the most obvious consequence of a noncompliance 
with contract[] specifications for food grade carbon dioxide would be 
ruination of any food or drink product into which the [contaminated] carbon 
dioxide was combined.‖107   
The court, however, rejected the application of the disappointed 
expectations rule.
108
  The court noted ―that if all property that one would 
reasonably expect to be injured because of the defective product is excluded 
from the definition of ‗other property,‘‖ the result would be that a buyer could 
never recover from a manufacturer in tort for property damage.
109
  The court 
reasoned that a plaintiff in a tort case must establish ―that the harm giving rise 
 
100. 131 S.W.3d 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
101. Id. at 460. 
102. See id. 
103. Id. at 463. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 465. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 465–66 (internal quotation omitted). 
108. Id. at 466. 
109. Id. 
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to the cause of action was reasonably foreseeable.‖110  Thus, under the 
disappointed expectations rule, by establishing the damages were reasonably 
foreseeable, ―the plaintiff in a tort action against a manufacturer [has] 
necessarily eliminate[d] its damaged property from the category of ‗other 
property‘ and . . . thereby[] undermin[ed] its case.‖111  After rejecting the 
disappointed expectations rule, the court held that the distributor could sue in 
tort for damage to the ―other property.‖112 
The Messer court clearly and correctly identified the consequence of 
adopting the disappointed expectations rule.  Because foreseeability is a 
prerequisite for both contract and tort recovery, once the ―other property‖ 
damage is classified as foreseeable in the tort case, it becomes foreseeable 
under the disappointed expectations test, which thereby precludes the tort 
action.  In essence, the disappointed expectations test virtually eliminates tort 
actions for ―other property‖ damage caused by a defective product. 
C. The Disappointed Expectations Rule Undercuts the Public Policy that 
Requires Sellers/Manufacturers to Produce and Promote Safe Products 
The disappointed expectations rule undercuts the societal concern for 
safety by removing the tort incentive for manufacturers to produce safer 
products.  The rule has that effect because all reasonably foreseeable property 
damage resulting from a defective product is not recoverable in tort.  Both 
contract law and tort law are based on the concept of duty.
113
  The duty under 
contract law arises from a consensual arrangement between two parties that 
bargain.
114
  Tort duties, on the other hand, arise from obligations imposed on 
members of society by law.
115
  A seller/manufacturer necessarily incurs both 
contract and tort duties when selling a product.  The determination of whether 
a manufacturer has assumed contract or tort duties ―rests . . . on an 
understanding of the . . . responsibilit[ies] a manufacturer must undertake in 
distributing [its] product.‖116  ―The law imposes tort duties upon [a] 
manufacturer[] to protect society[] . . . from the physical harm . . . [that] may 
result from defective products.‖117  Contract law seeks to hold parties to their 
promises and thereby insure that each party receives the benefit of his 
bargain.
118
 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. See Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Wis. 1998). 
114. Id. 
115. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986). 
116. Id. 
117. Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 699 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Wis. 2005). 
118. Daanen & Janssen, Inc., 573 N.W.2d at 846. 
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It is generally agreed that important policy reasons exist for redressing 
product-quality defects through contract law and safety concerns through tort 
law.
119
  ―Products liability [law] grew out of a public policy judgment that 
people needed more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by‖ 
contract law.
120
  Holding manufacturers liable for any personal injury or 
property damage caused by a defective product protects safety concerns.
121
  
―[Property] damage is considered so akin to personal injury [damage] that the 
two are treated alike‖ under product liability law.122  ―One important purpose 
of defective-product tort law is to encourage the manufacture of safer 
products.‖123  Tort rules are designed ―to provide appropriate safe-product 
incentives.‖124  Any attempt to diminish that basic incentive requires a 
justification.
125
  Simply because tort and contract liability overlap is no 
justification for supplanting the ordinary rule of tort liability that applies when 
a product causes ―other property‖ damage.126 
Every time a product is purchased and fails, there are disappointed 
expectations.  The U.C.C. recognizes that a buyer purchases a product for its 
general
127
 or specialized
128
 purpose.  When that purpose is not fulfilled, a 
disappointed expectation occurs.  The disappointed expectations rule 
essentially destroys all tort claims where a product‘s failed performance 
causes ―other property‖ damage.129  The avowed reason for endorsing the 
disappointed expectations rule is that the buyer should have foreseen the 
incurred damages and provided for his own protection through negotiated 
warranties, remedies, or insurance.
130
  How can the fact that a buyer could 
have contracted for some form of damage protection (hypothetical contract) 
address the societal concern for safer products?  It does not.  In fact, the 
doctrine actually undercuts the societal concern by removing the tort incentive 
from the manufacturer to produce a safer product.  Is there a sufficient 
justification to deny the tort approach in favor of a contract approach to ―other 
property‖ damage?  The interests to be balanced are the societal concern for 
safer products versus the interest in having buyers foresee ―other property‖ 
 
119. Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 471 N.W.2d 179, 185 n.11 (Wis. 1991). 
120. E. River, 476 U.S. at 866. 
121. Gen. Cas. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 198, 200–01 (Wis. 1999). 
122. E. River, 476 U.S. at 867. 
123. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 881 (1997). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 882–83. 
127. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 402.314 (2007–2008). 
128. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 402.315 (2007–2008). 
129. See supra Part III. 
130. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Wis. 2005). 
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damages in the event of a product‘s failed performance and negotiating some 
protection.  The greater interest is to continue to place the burden on 
manufacturers to produce safer products through tort liability.  The 
disappointed expectations rule unfortunately focuses on the possibility that a 
buyer could have negotiated protection from property damage caused by a 
defective product, rather than focus on the manufacturer‘s duty to produce a 
safer product.  In other words, if the buyer fails to negotiate for contract 
protection from foreseeable property damage, the buyer loses the right to 
pursue tort recovery.  Such a rule fails to serve the public policy of promoting 
safer products. 
D. The Disappointed Expectations Rule Is an Enigma to Comprehend and 
Apply 
The first state to adopt the reasonably foreseeable test of the disappointed 
expectations rule was Michigan.
131
  In Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, 
Inc.,
132
 dairy farmers purchased a milking system to milk their cows.
133
  After 
the system was in operation for a period, the cows became ill and died, or had 
to be sold for beef.
134
  The vacuum system on the milking equipment was 
defective.
135
  The farmers sued on contract and tort theories to recover their 
losses.
136
  The main issue before the court was whether the contract or tort 
statute of limitations should apply.
137
  By the time the case was filed, the 
contract statute of limitations had expired, but the tort statute of limitations 
had not.
138
  In discussing the economic loss doctrine, the court explained that 
the doctrine turns ―on a distinction drawn between transactions involving the 
sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations are 
protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale of 
defective products to individual consumers who are injured in a 
manner . . . traditionally . . . remedied by resort to‖ tort law.139  In Neibarger, 
the defective milking system damaged more than itself; it damaged the 
farmers‘ cows, which were ―other property.‖  The court noted that in many 
cases, failure of a product to perform as expected might result in damage to 
―other property.‖140  The court characterized the foreseeable ―other property‖ 
 
131. Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 613. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 615. 
138. Id. at 613–14. 
139. Id. at 615. 
140. Id. at 620. 
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damage caused by the defective milking system to the cows as a ―common 
problem for dairy farmers‖141 and a ―normal part of the dairy business.‖142  As 
a result, the court held that the damages were reasonably foreseeable ―other 
property‖ damage at the time of contracting and only recoverable through the 
U.C.C., not tort law.
143
 
Another case that suggests how to interpret the reasonably foreseeable test 
is Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc.
144
  In Detroit Edison, a utility company 
contracted with NABCO to supply pipe to be used in its power plant.
145
  The 
pipe was used to carry steam.
146
  A number of years after installation, one of 
the pipes burst, injuring seventeen people and causing significant property 
damage.
147
  Detroit Edison filed a products liability action to recoup its $20 
million in damages.
148
  NABCO defended on the basis that the tort claims 
were barred by the economic loss doctrine and Detroit Edison‘s sole remedy 
was under the U.C.C.
149
  The Sixth Circuit applied the Neibarger analysis.
150
  
The court reasoned that Neibarger requires a court to focus ―on the parties 
involved and the nature of the product‘s use.‖151  The court held that it was 
―foreseeable that pipes . . . that [carry] steam at high temperatures and high 
pressures could explode upon failure.‖152  The court characterized the 
damages caused by the explosion as an ―inherent hazard[].‖153  The court 
concluded that the consequences of this inherent hazard were reasonably 
foreseeable.
154
 
The Neibarger decision figured prominently in the Grams court‘s 
adoption of the disappointed expectations rule.
155
  The Grams court, however, 
has provided conflicting signals on how to apply the rule.  As an initial matter, 
the court indicated that this foreseeability rule ―does not mean that contract 
principles will envelop all damages foreseeable ‗in a remote or general 
sense.‘‖156  In other words, the reasonably foreseeable test will not cover all 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 620–21. 
143. See id. 
144. 35 F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 1994). 
145. Id. at 238. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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150. Id. at 241–43. 
151. Id. at 242. 
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155. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 175 (Wis. 2005). 
156. Id. at 178 (quoting Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 975 (E.D. 
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foreseeable property damage.  Rather, the Grams court offers the limitation 
that ―the economic loss doctrine will [only] apply when ‗prevention of the 
subject risk was one of the contractual expectations motivating the purchase 
of the defective product.‘‖157  The court suggested such a determination 
requires a two-step inquiry.
158
  The first inquiry is to determine the buyer‘s 
expectations.
159
  In Grams, the court concluded that the milk substitute was 
purchased to foster the healthy development and growth of young calves.
160
  
The second inquiry is to determine whether the aggrieved buyer‘s claim is 
―about disappointment with those expectations.‖161  In Grams, the court 
concluded that the product malnourished and killed the calves, which was a 
prime example of the disappointed expectations rule.
162
  The problem with the 
offered limitation is that every product has a purpose for which it is 
purchased, and every buyer is disappointed when the product fails to perform 
as expected.
163
  Virtually all damages that flow from such disappointment are 
foreseeable damages and under the disappointed expectations test, precluded 
from tort recovery.  The Grams limitation suggests that there are ―other 
foreseeable damages‖ that would somehow qualify for tort recovery.  The 
limitation offers a distinction that is impossible for the courts to apply.  Courts 
are skilled at distinguishing foreseeable from unforeseeable damages
164
 but 
not at distinguishing one type of foreseeable damage from another type of 
foreseeable damage.  This is a prescription for inconsistent and contradictory 
decisions. 
The application of the disappointed expectations rule is not a simple 
matter, and the Grams court acknowledged such.
165
  The court offered a 
hypothetical to illustrate the difference between foreseeable damages that are 
covered by the disappointed expectations rule, and other damages that would 
not be foreseeable and recoverable through tort.
166
  In Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., 
the buyer bought windows that were treated against rot and decay.
167
  Seven 
years after the windows were installed, the windows were rotting and the rot 
 
Wis. 1999)). 
157. Id. (quoting Rich Prods. Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 975). 
158. Id. at 179. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998). 
164. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
165. Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 180. 
166. Id. at 177 (citing Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., 652 N.W.2d 806 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)). 
167. Selzer, 652 N.W.2d at 809–10. 
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spread to the siding around the window.
168
  The court noted that the rot in the 
wood surrounding the windows was a direct consequence of the rot in the 
windows themselves.
169
  Therefore, the collateral rot was a part of the buyer‘s 
disappointed expectations.
170
  On the other hand, had the windows not rotted, 
―but spontaneously shattered, spewing shards of glass into an adjacent 
Picasso,‖ such damage would have occurred ―in an entirely unanticipated 
manner, going well beyond a failure to perform as expected and entitling [the 
buyer] to pursue a tort remedy.‖171  In other words, the disappointed 
expectations rule would not apply because the damages would not have been 
foreseeable at the time of contracting.  The colorful hypothetical illustrates 
how very remote the damage occurrence must be to qualify for tort recovery. 
The cases decided after Grams have attempted to glean its meaning but 
necessarily have encountered significant difficulties.  In Foremost Farms USA 
Coop. v. Performance Process, Inc.,
172
 a buyer purchased a defoamer to be 
used in the production of its food products.
173
  The purpose of the defoamer 
was to reduce foaming during the process of manufacturing food products.
174
  
Unfortunately, the defoamer was contaminated with a foreign substance and 
spoiled the buyer‘s food products.175  The buyer sought to recoup its 
significant losses
176
 through tort theories.
177
 
The tort theories were alleged on the basis that the defective defoamer 
damaged the food products, which were ―other property.‖178  The court 
identified the dispositive issue as whether the damaged food products 
qualified as ―other property.‖179  The court correctly noted that there are two 
tests utilized by the courts to determine whether damaged property is ―other 
property‖—the integrated systems test and the disappointed expectations 
test.
180
  The integrated systems test was not determinative because the food 
products and defoamer were not part of an integrated system.
181
  Thus, the 
court focused on application of the disappointed expectations test.
182
 
 
168. Id. at 810. 
169. Id. at 817. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. 726 N.W.2d 289 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
173. Id. at 291. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 292. 
176. The losses totaled $587,118.30.  Id. at 292–93. 
177. Id. at 293. 
178. Id. at 294. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 300. 
182. Id. 
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The court gleaned from Grams that the disappointed expectations test is 
directed at determining whether a buyer should have foreseen the need to 
protect itself against the incurred losses through its contract.
183
  More 
specifically, ―[t]he test focuses on the expected function of the product‖ and 
whether the purchaser should have reasonably foreseen that the product could 
cause the ―other property‖ damage.184  More simply, the court stated that the 
question is ―whether a reasonable purchaser in the plaintiff‘s position should 
have foreseen the risk.‖185  If so, the matter should have been dealt with in the 
contract, thus precluding a buyer from asserting tort theories.  The core issue 
was whether the damages incurred were reasonably foreseeable.
186
  The court 
concluded that the damaged food products were not a foreseeable 
consequence from a defective defoamer.
187
  The court noted that determining 
whether damages are reasonably foreseeable is necessarily fact-intensive.
188
  
Some situations are ―so obviously not susceptible to reasonable anticipation 
that no further inquiry is needed to conclude that the ‗disappointed 
expectations‘ test is not met.‖189  For example, ―[n]o one expects a glass 
window to spontaneously shatter and damage a nearby object.‖190  The 
purchaser of a window would not reasonably foresee such an occurrence.  
―On the other hand, [where] a product is purchased to nourish calves, . . . a 
reasonable purchaser should anticipate damage to the calves and bargain 
accordingly.‖191 
The Foremost court offered those examples to illustrate the opposite ends 
of the foreseeability spectrum, and it noted that the cases in between will 
necessarily be difficult to resolve.
192
  The court did, however, offer a number 
of factors that must be considered in determining whether the damages 
incurred were reasonably foreseeable.
193
  Those factors include ―the purpose 
for purchasing the product, the reasonableness of anticipating a risk of the 
product‘s failed performance, the availability of warranties or risk sharing 
mechanisms, . . . the extremity of the facts,‖194 and the likelihood that the 
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194. Id. 
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product will interact with other products or property.
195
  In Foremost, the 
court framed the question as whether the buyer ―should have anticipated that 
the defoamer might function properly as a defoamer, yet contain a 
contaminant‖ that might damage the buyer‘s food products.196  Framed as 
such, the court held that there was no evidence to suggest that the buyer 
should have reasonably foreseen ―that the defoamer would contain a 
contaminant . . . that would render [the buyer‘s food] products unfit for human 
consumption.‖197  Therefore, the elements of the disappointed expectations 
rule were not satisfied, with the consequent result that the defoamer‘s damage 
to the food products qualified as damage to ―other property.‖198 
It is critical to note that how the court frames the issue will likely 
determine the outcome under the disappointed expectations rule.  For 
example, had the court in Foremost framed the issue to be whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that a defective defoamer used in a food 
manufacturing process could damage the manufactured food products, the 
court likely would have reached a different result.  Rather, the court framed 
the issue as whether the buyer should have foreseen that the defoamer would 
contain a contaminant that might damage the food products.
199
  The 
reasonable foreseeability was focused on the nature of the defect rather than 
the foreseeability of the damage that might be caused by the defect.  The 
focus as required by Grams, however, should be on the foreseeability of the 
damages as a result of a failed performance,
200
 not the nature of the defect or 
the reason for the failed performance.  The question should have been whether 
it was reasonable to foresee that a defective defoamer used in a manufacturing 
food process would damage the food products. 
Framed differently, the Foremost outcome is not free from doubt.  A 
similar issue arose in Wilson v. Tuxen,
201
 where the buyers purchased dairy 
cattle for their farm.
202
  Within several months of purchase, the cows exhibited 
a fatal, contagious disease that required their slaughter.
203
  In addition, the 
diseased cows infected a calf owned by the buyers that was not purchased 
from the sellers.
204
  The farmers sued in contract and tort to recover their 
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losses.
205
  The buyers argued that the purchased cows were ―other property‖ 
because they were not part of an integrated system nor were the damages 
foreseeable.
206
  In addition, the buyers argued that ―other property‖ was 
damaged because the purchased cows infected their other calf that was not 
part of the transaction.
207
  The buyers asserted that the correct question under 
the disappointed expectations rule was whether they should have reasonably 
foreseen that the purchased cows would have had a fatal, infectious disease.
208
 
The court disagreed with that formulation; rather, the court held that the 
correct question was whether the buyers should have foreseen that the cows 
would fail to produce.
209
  The court rejected the notion that the question was 
whether the buyers should have foreseen ―the risk that the cows might be 
infected with a particular ailment.‖210  The court concluded that the case was 
similar to Grams in that the cows‘ failure to produce milk as expected was 
contrary to the buyers‘ expectations of the cows‘ performance.211  The court 
noted that no fact finding would be necessary under the disappointed 
expectations rule because the record points in only one direction—the 
damages were foreseeable.
212
 
However, even though the buyers failed under the disappointed 
expectations rule, the court held that the buyers were able to pursue their 
damages through tort theories because the diseased cows infected the non-
diseased calf, which qualified as ―other property‖ damage.213  During the 
negotiation process, the buyers asked the seller if the seller ever had any 
problems with the particular disease in his herd.
214
  The court noted that the 
buyers knew there was some risk that the disease might be in the purchased 
cows.
215
 
Given the foreseeability that the disease could be present in the herd, 
perhaps the correct question under the disappointed expectations test should 
have been whether a reasonable buyer should have reasonably foreseen that 
mixing infected cows with healthy cows could infect the healthy ones.  Under 
such phrasing, the damage to the ―other calf‖ would have been reasonably 
foreseeable under the disappointed expectations test and thereby preclude any 
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tort claim.  It seems reasonably foreseeable that placing otherwise healthy 
cows with cows with a fatal, contagious disease will likely cause the healthy 
cows to become infected. 
Another illustration of a court‘s framing of the issue as the determinative 
factor is Coach USA, Inc. v. Van Hool N.V.
216
  In Coach USA, a bus was 
leased for use in a charter business.
217
  On one particular charter, a fire 
destroyed the bus and the passengers‘ personal property.218  The lessee sued 
the manufacturer and lessor on tort theories.
219
  The lease agreement between 
the parties disclaimed all warranties, excluded consequential damages, and 
provided that the lessee was to indemnify the lessor for any liability arising 
out of the use or operation of the bus.
220
  The court ruled that the baggage and 
other personal property of the passengers was not integrated into the bus and, 
as such, did not fall within the integrated systems rule.
221
  However, the court 
reasoned that the bus was leased ―for the purpose of transporting passengers 
and their personal property from one location to another.‖222  Further, the 
lease agreement specifically mentioned liability for personal property.
223
  
Therefore, the damages sought by the lessee were reasonably foreseeable 
damages that could result from the bus‘s failed performance.  As such, the 
damages fell within the disappointed expectations rule and were not damage 
to ―other property.‖224  Significantly, the court focused on the foreseeability of 
the damages that would follow from a failed performance of the bus, and not 
on the foreseeability of the manner or means that caused the damages—the 
fire.
225
 
In discussing the scope of foreseeable damages under the disappointed 
expectations test, the Grams court also stated that ―[i]f a product is expected 
and intended to interact with other products and property, it naturally follows 
that the [purchased] product could adversely affect and even damage‖ such 
other products and property.
226
  Clearly, this is a broad statement of the scope 
of damages covered by the disappointed expectations rule.  Property that is 
expected and intended to interact with the product and is naturally damaged 
by the defective product falls within the coverage of the disappointed 
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expectations rule.  The court‘s statement of the scope of the rule is 
unquestionably as broad as the traditional standards of foreseeability under 
contract,
227
 U.C.C.,
228
 and tort law.
229
 
At the same time that the Grams court stated that the rule covers property 
that is expected and intended to interact with the defective product and that 
could naturally be damaged by it, the court rejected any rule that would 
include an inquiry based on the kind of property harmed.
230
  In the court‘s 
opinion, a focus on the kind of property harmed would eventually ―cause the 
erosion of the U.C.C.‖ and destroy ―the fundamental distinction between 
contract and tort‖ law.231  Rather, the court concluded that ―[a] rule that allows 
tort recovery based on what is damaged, rather than whether the risk of that 
damage was within the scope of the bargain, would leave little room for 
contract.‖232 
The conflict between damages that result from foreseeable interaction and 
damages that could have been within the scope of the bargain was also 
addressed in Foremost.
233
  The Foremost court, when discussing reasonable 
foreseeability, noted that despite the Grams court‘s statement to the contrary, 
reasonably foreseeable ―should not be equated with ‗foreseeable interaction‘ 
between the purchased product and the damaged property.‖234  As an initial 
matter, the court noted that the term ―interact‖ is ambiguous and subject to 
different meanings.
235
  However, once that ambiguity is resolved, the court 
stated that foreseeable interaction, by itself, does not establish that damage 
was reasonably foreseeable within the meaning of the disappointed 
expectations test.
236
  Rather, the court said that ―foreseeable interaction is a 
factor to consider when applying the ‗disappointed expectations‘ test, but is 
not, by itself, sufficient to satisfy the test.‖237 
The Grams court‘s explanation of the disappointed expectations rule 
presents difficult interpretation issues for the courts and the practicing bar.  
The Grams court indicated foreseeable damages include property damage that 
is a result of foreseeable interaction with other property.  The Foremost court 
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explained that foreseeable interaction is only a factor in applying the 
disappointed expectations test.  Thus, some foreseeable interaction is covered 
by the rule, and some foreseeable interaction is not.  The Grams court 
expressly stated that not all foreseeable damages fall within the scope of the 
disappointed expectations rule.  The only damages covered are those damages 
that were within the contemplation of the parties or those that, at the time of 
contracting, were a foreseeable result of the failure of the product to meet its 
expectations.  Thus, some foreseeable damages are covered by the rule and 
some foreseeable damages are not.  Courts have little experience in 
distinguishing one type of foreseeable damage from another.  Also, how the 
court frames the issue under the disappointed expectations test is critical.  
Notably, whether the court frames the issue as the foreseeability of the 
damages or the event causing the damages will determine the outcome of the 
disappointed expectations test.  The disappointed expectations rule is clearly 
difficult to comprehend and very problematic to apply in a fair and consistent 
fashion. 
E. The Disappointed Expectations Rule Places the Burden to Ensure 
Contract Coverage for Reasonably Foreseeable Property Damage on the 
Wrong Party 
The disappointed expectations rule places the burden on the buyer to 
assume, allocate, or insure against the risk that the product will prove 
defective.  The assumption is that the buyer is best able to foresee the 
damages a defective product might cause the buyer.
238
  It would seem equally 
reasonable to place this risk on the seller/manufacturer since the seller has the 
most experience with the kind of damage its defective product has actually 
caused.  Nevertheless, the question should be which party is more likely to 
introduce the prospect of damages into the contract negotiations.  At least one 
court has seriously questioned whether the buyer is the best party on which to 
place the burden of negotiating for future damages.  In Foremost Farms USA 
Cooperative v. Performance Process, Inc.,
239
 a buyer purchased a defoamer 
that subsequently proved defective and contaminated food products that the 
buyer produced.
240
  In discussing whether the buyer is the best party to foresee 
future damages by a defective product, the court offered some rhetorical 
questions that challenged the assumption that the buyer is the best party to 
foresee damages.
241
  When referencing a dispute between a farmer and its 
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chemical supplier over a defective crop spray,
242
 the court asked ―do 
farmers . . . normally know that a chemical applied to crops for one purpose 
might cause harm in a manner unrelated to the expected function of the 
chemical?‖243  ―To what extent are . . . farmers expected to contemplate 
possible damage scenarios?‖244  The court noted that a careful buyer might 
―anticipate the desirability of obtaining [broad] contractual 
protection . . . against all damage caused by a defective product,‖ but ―no 
manufacturer or distributor would agree to such far-reaching liability.‖245  In 
addition, the court noted that in many cases, the buyer‘s bargaining position is 
extremely disparate.
246
  Thus, the possibility of a buyer negotiating protection 
in the contract is primarily theoretical.  As a result, the buyer is discouraged 
from introducing the issue into the negotiations. 
The buyer is clearly not the best party to ensure that the prospect of 
reasonably foreseeable damages is introduced into contract negotiations.  The 
seller/manufacturer also has no incentive to raise the issue because the 
disappointed expectations test precludes tort recovery for all ―reasonably 
foreseeable‖ damages.  Therefore, the seller/manufacturer is protected from 
tort liability by the buyer‘s failure to address the issue.247  As a result of 
placing the bargaining burden on the buyer, the disappointed expectations test 
actually has incentives to avoid addressing foreseeable damages in the parties‘ 
contract.  The disappointed expectations rule has the opposite impact than 
what was intended. 
F. The Disappointed Expectations Rule Has Been Rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court 
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.,
248
 a shipbuilder installed 
a new hydraulic system in a new ship.
249
  After the ship was sold to the initial 
user, the initial user added new equipment to the ship.
250
  Subsequently, the 
initial owner sold the ship to a second owner.
251
  Thereafter, the ship caught 
fire and sank due to a defect in the original hydraulic system.
252
  The second 
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owner sought to recover its losses through tort theories on the basis that the 
defective product (hydraulic system) damaged ―other property‖ (the new 
equipment added to the ship).
253
  The court held that the added equipment did 
constitute ―other property;‖254 thus, the second owner was permitted to utilize 
tort theories to recoup its loss.
255
  In analyzing the case, the court made the 
following statement: 
 
Of course, nothing prevents a user/reseller from offering a 
warranty.  But neither does anything prevent a Manufacturer 
and an Initial User from apportioning through their contract 
potential loss of any other items—say, added equipment or 
totally separate physical property—that a defective 
manufactured product, say, an exploding engine, might cause.  
No court has thought that the mere possibility of such a 
contract term precluded tort recovery for damage to an Initial 
User‘s other property.256 
 
The court initially noted that a manufacturer and buyer can, through their 
contract, apportion for any loss to ―other property‖ that a defective product 
might cause.
257
  Significantly, the court concluded that no court had thought 
that the mere possibility of such a contract term should preclude tort recovery 
for damage to ―other property.‖258  In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
accurately predicted the impact of the disappointed expectations test.  The 
disappointed expectations test precludes tort recovery where the damage to 
the buyer‘s ―other property‖ could have been the subject of negotiations 
between the buyer and seller.  In other words, the mere possibility of 
addressing the ―other property‖ damage in the parties‘ contract precludes tort 
liability.  This is precisely the kind of intrusion of contract principles into tort 
law that the Court rejected. 
G. The Disappointed Expectations Rule Violates the U.C.C. Policy of 
Bargaining for an Exclusive Remedy 
The rules stated in the U.C.C. are default rules that apply in the absence of 
contrary agreement.
259
  The U.C.C. expressly provides that the rules within 
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the U.C.C. can be changed by the parties‘ contract,260 with some 
exceptions.
261
  The U.C.C.‘s warranty rules define the performance 
expectations for a product.
262
  When a product fails to meet its performance 
expectations, the U.C.C. also specifies the remedies available to an aggrieved 
buyer.
263
  Specifically, the U.C.C. permits a seller/manufacturer to 
contractually modify or limit the remedies available to an aggrieved party for 
damages sustained as a result of a defective product.
264
  The damages 
specified by the U.C.C. include property damage caused by a product‘s failure 
to meet its performance expectations.
265
  Specifically, the U.C.C. provides that 
the parties‘ contract ―may limit or alter the measure of damages 
recoverable . . . as by limiting the buyer‘s remedies . . . to repair [or] 
replacement.‖266  Further, the U.C.C. mandates that the buyer‘s resort to any 
remedy ―is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in 
which case it is the sole remedy.‖267  Therefore, under the U.C.C. the only 
way a remedy can be mandated as the sole remedy is if the parties‘ agreement 
expressly so provides.  The U.C.C. policy is clearly in favor of providing the 
injured party with the full range of remedies available to remedy his wrong 
unless he agrees otherwise.  The disappointed expectations rule completely 
contradicts this U.C.C. policy.  The disappointed expectations rule provides 
that in the event a defective product causes ―other property‖ damage, the sole 
and exclusive remedy is through contract law, not tort law.  The mandate is 
not triggered by the buyer expressly agreeing to such a limitation as required 
by the U.C.C., but rather by the failure of the buyer to have foreseen certain 
damages and have provided for them in the contract.  No one could 
reasonably object to such a limitation where it is the subject of free bargaining 
as required by the U.C.C.  But, to impose such an exclusive limitation in the 
absence of bargaining is contrary to the U.C.C.‘s policy of bargaining for an 
exclusive remedy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The disappointed expectations rule provides that when a defective product 
causes property damage that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
contracting, contract law is the sole remedy available to the buyer.  The rule is 
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the most recent progression of tort law drowning in a sea of contract law.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently adopted the rule.  The rule, however, 
is deeply flawed.  First, it provides a tort immunity to sellers/manufacturers 
without them bargaining for such protection.  Tort immunity is normally a 
bargained-for protection.  It should not be given by judicial fiat.  Also, one 
must satisfy stringent bargaining requirements to gain tort immunity.  Those 
bargaining requirements are rendered meaningless by the disappointed 
expectations rule.  Second, the disappointed expectations rule essentially 
destroys the ―other property‖ exception to the economic loss doctrine.  ―Other 
property‖ damage has always been the domain of tort law.  The disappointed 
expectations rule converts reasonably foreseeable property damage into 
consequential damages governed by the U.C.C., not tort law.  Third, the 
impact of the increasing contract coverage for defective products and 
corresponding decrease in tort coverage is to undercut the public policy of tort 
law that encourages manufacturers to produce safer products.  Fourth, the 
disappointed expectations rule is, and has proven to be, an enigma for the 
courts to decipher and apply in a fair and uniform manner.  Each one of these 
criticisms alone is reason enough to not support the disappointed expectations 
rule.  Together, however, they overwhelmingly indicate the disappointed 
expectations rule is not a positive addition to the legal landscape of the 
economic loss doctrine. 
